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ABSTRACT 
The automatic terminal approach system (ATAS) is a concept for improving 
the pilot/machine interface with cockpit automation. The ATAS can automatically 
fly a published instrument approach by using stored instrument approach data to 
automatically tune airplane avionics, control the airplane's autopilot, and 
display status information to the pilot. 
A piloted simulation study was conducted to determine the feasibility 
of an ATAS, determine pilot acceptance, and examine pilot/ATAS interaction.' 
Seven instrument-rated pilots each flew four instrument approaches with a base- 
line heading select autopilot mode. The ATAS runs resulted in lower flight 
technical error, lower pilot workload, and fewer blunders than with the baseline 
autopilot. The ATAS status display enabled the pilots to maintain situational 
awareness during the automatic approaches. The system was well accepted by the 
pilots. 
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ATAS CONCEPT 
This figure depicts the ATAS concept in block diagram form. A flight 
system would store approach data in memory and use a microcomputer to control 
aircraft radios and autopilot and to accept inputs from the pilot. The pilot 
will use an approach chart for backup. Air traffic control (ATC) vectors and 
altitude assignments could be entered directly on the ATAS control panel. When 
the aircraft is cleared for the approach by ATC, the pilot would press a button 
to enable ATAS to automatically complete the approach. At the conclusion of 
the approach the ATAS would automatically execute the missed approach procedure 
unless the pilot disengages the system to land. 
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ATAS CONTROL PANEL 
The ATAS control panel constructed for a simulation study is shown below. 
At the bottom of the panel is a conventional autopilot control head. The ATAS 
controls on the top half of the panel consist of a few rotary knobs and push-‘ 
buttons around the CRT display. The three knobs to the left of the CRT are 
used to manually input heading, altitude, and speed to fly. The three push- 
buttons to the left of the CRT determine whether the course and altitude 
parameters are automatically or manually controlled and whether the autothrottle 
is on or off. Switches and buttons along the top turn ATAS on and off and 
select the go-around and holding pattern functions. The CRT provides a 
continuous display of approach status including reference course, altitude, and 
speed; distance and direction to the airport; position in approach (OUTBOUND TO 
PROCEDURE TURN, FINAL APPROACH, ENTERING HOLDING PATTERN, etc); and the actual 
autopilot mode. 
The ATAS panel was installed in the Langley General Aviation Simulator 
immediately to the right of the flight instruments. 
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EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
Seven instrument rated pilots were used in the simulation study. Each 
pilot flew 8 instrument approaches. In one half of each pilot's approaches 
the ATAS system was used. In the other half a baseline heading select autopilot 
configuration was used. Each pilot flew four ILS approaches with radar vector- 
ing and four NDB approaches with no radar vectoring. An outside-the-windshield 
visual scene with variable ceiling and visibility was used for breakout and 
landing. The ceiling and visibility were set above landing minima for four of 
each pilot's runs and below minima for the other half of the runs. 
Realistic ATC communications with the pilot were provided. The communica- 
tions included radar vectors, altitude assignments, controlled handoffs, and 
clearance for the approach and for landing. A self-paced side task was used to 
estimate pilot workload. The pilot was given a circular slide rule type flight 
computer. On pilot request, a time-speed-distance problem was given verbally. 
The pilot solved the problem and announced the answer. 
The airplane math model used was of a typical general aviation single engine 
airplane. 
EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
- 4 ILS (VECTORING, PRECISION) 
- 4 WDB (NO VECTORING, NONPRECISION) 
- 4 ATAS ON, 4 ATAS OFF (HEADING SELECT) 
- k WEATHER ABOVE MINIMA, II WEATHER BELOW MINIMA 
- 8 APPROACHES, 7 PILOTS (ALL IFR, 300 TO 7000 HRS) 
- SELF-PACED SIDE TASK (TIME-SPEED-DIST) 
- REALISTIC ATC COMMUNICATIONS 
- DATA 
-PILOT COMMENTS 
-X,Y,Z PLOTS WITH PRINTS 
-RESEARCHER OBSERVATIONS 
-SIDETASK RESULTS 
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RESULTS 
Fewer pilot blunders were made with the ATAS than with the baseline 
autopilot. A blunder is defined as any pilot error that results in a flight 
path deviation. Eleven blunders were made with the ATAS. Three factors were 
predominant in these errors. Problems with ATAS mode interaction were involved 
in 9 of the 11 blunders, a lack of situational awareness in 4 of the 11 blunders, 
and a data entry error in one of the occurrences. An example of a mode error 
would be trying to select automatic ATAS modes when the autopilot is off. An 
example of a situational awareness blunder is forgetting that a landing flap 
setting is selected while the ATAS is executing an automatic missed approach. 
The data entry error occurred when the pilot was assigned a heading of 160 by 
ATC and dialed in 060 instead. 
Nineteen blunders were made with the baseline autopilot. Situational 
awareness was involved 11 times, instrument interpretation 7 times, input errors 
3 times, and chart interpretation and basic airplane familiarization once each. 
Examples of situational awareness errors include descending below decision height 
in clouds, flying through the localizer instead of intercepting it, and not having 
the navigation radios tuned properly prior to reaching the localizer. Instrument 
interpretation errors were made on the NDB approaches and with the HSI on the 
localizer back course during ILS missed approaches. 
BLUNDERS 11 ATAS ON 
TYPES (ATAS) 
- MODE ERRORS (9) - SETTING AUTO ALT IN DESCENT 
- TRYING TO SELECT AUTO h'ITH A,P, OFF 
- FORGETTING TO SELECT AUTO ALT OR CRS 
- SITUATION AWARENESS (4) - CLIMBOUT IIITH FLAPS 
- DIALED 060 FOR 160 VECTOR AND 
DID NOT REALIZE ERROR 
- DATA ENTRY (1) - VECTOR INPUT ERROR 
19 ATAS OFF 
TYPES (NON-ATAS) 
- SITUATION AWARENESS (11) - NOT REALIZING A WRONG DIRECTION 
TURN WAS COMMANDED 
- MADE MISSED APPROACH WITH RUNWAY 
IN SIGHT 
- LOCALIZER OVERSHOOTS 
- DESCENT BELOW DH/LANDED BELOW MINIMA 
- RADIOS NOT TUNED AT LOCALIZER 
- 2 MILE DEVIATION ON MISSED APPROACH 
- AT 1700 FEET (MDA+8601 AT M,A,P, 
- INSTRUMENT INTERPRETATION (7) - HSI REVERSE SENSING 
- NDB TRACKING 
- INPUT ERROR (3) - COMMAND WRONG DIRECTION TURN 
- RADIOS NOT TUNED 
- CHART INTERPRETATION (1) 
- AIRPLANE FAMILIARIZATION (11 
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EXAMPLE OF BLUNDER WITH AUTOPILOT 
A plan view pilot of an ILS approach, including a missed approach, is 
shown below. The ordinate and abscissa indicate distance in nautical miles 
along the runway axis and perpendicular to the runway axis, respectively. The 
run begins near the left edge of the plot. The airplane is vectored to the 
ILS and the approach and missed approach are flown normally. After making a 
normal holding pattern entry, however, the pilot rotated the HSI heading bug 
more than 180 degrees to the right. This caused an inadvertent left turn out 
of the holding pattern. The pilot then misinterpreted the HSI course error 
indicator and turned away from the localizer in an effort to intercept it. 
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ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF BLUNDER WITH AUTOPILOT 
The plot below has the same format as the previous example plot. The 
run starts at the left edge and the airplane is vectored to the ILS localizer. 
The pilot was distracted by tuning to the tower frequency and communicating 
with ATC and did not intercept the localizer. The ATC controller had to call 
this to the attention of the pilot and radar vectored the airplane out for 
another try. 
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EXAMPLE OF BLUNDERS WITH ATAS 
The plot below is a side view of an NDB approach. The ordinate depicts 
airplane altitude in feet and the abscissa shows distance along the runway 
axis in nautical miles. The NDB used in this approach is located on the airport. 
The run began at the left of the plot. The pilot turned the autopilot on 
but did not turn the pitch channel on to engage the pitch "servo". This made 
it impossible to switch the ATAS altitude mode to automatic. The pilot tried 
to put the altitude mode into automatic, however, and allowed large altitude 
excursions while trying. The pilot finally turned the autopilot pitch channel 
on and had no further difficulty during the approach or missed approach. 
ATTEMPT TO ENGAGE AUTO ALTITUDE WITH AUTOPILOT OFF 
DISTRNCE 
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PILOT COMMENTS 
Pilot comments were grouped into control, display, and mode interaction 
comments. Control comments tend to indicate that the autopilot and ATAS 
controls should be consolidated to reduce confusion. As the system was 
implemented, the pilot did not always use the same control for control of the 
same parameter. For example, the HSI heading bug was used to select heading 
when the ATAS was off and the heading knob on the ATAS panel selected heading 
when ATAS was on. The display comments indicate that situational awareness 
could be maintained with the information shown. The pilots desired additional 
data, however, such as time-to-airport and a positive indication that valid 
navigational signals are being received. The mode interaction comments indicate 
that much improvement is needed in this area. The system should provide for 
more prompting and should generate an appropriate advisory if the pilot attempts 
to select a mode when conditions required for that mode are not met. The AUTO 
and MANUAL labeling was confusing. Does MANUAL mean that they should hand-fly, 
manually make entries to the basic autopilot, 
the ATAS display? 
or manually set parameters onto 
Some pilots consistently made the error of dialing in a new 
ATC vector then selecting AUTO to "automatically'1 fly the heading. The pilots 
had confidence in ATAS once everything was running automatically but sometimes 
had difficulty reaching that mode. 
PILOT COMMENTS 
CONTROLS 
- KNOB SCALINGS NEED IMPROVEMENT 
- PUT ATAS POSITION ON AUTOPILOT MODE CONTROL 
- SERVO DRIVE THE HSI HEADING BUG 
- CONSOLIDATE ATAS AND AUTOPILOT CONTROLS 
DISPLAY 
- DISTANCE AND DIRECTION TO AIRPORT IS USEFUL 
- WOULD LIKE TINE-TO-AIRPORT 
- WOULD LIKE IUTERSECTION PASSAGE ANNUNCIATION 
- ALL NEEDED INFORMATION IS THERE, WELL THOUGHT OUT 
- WOULD LIKE A SIMPLE MAP 
'- WOULD LIKE POSITIVE INDICATION OF RECEIVING VALID NAV SIGNALS 
- WOULD LIKE INDICATION THAT FINAL VECTOR WILL INTERCEPT THE ILS 
RODE/INTERACTION 
- AUTO/MNUAL LABELING CONFUSING 
- TRANSITION TO AUTO SHOULD BE SAME FOR COURSE AND ALTITUDE 
- NEEDS PROMPTING 
- WANT ABILITY TO CYCLE BETWEEN AUTO AND WANUAL WITHOUT RESTARTING 
APPROACH 
- AUTOTHROTTLE SHOULD DISENGAGE WITH AUTOPILOT 
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SUMMARY 
A piloted simulation study was performed to evaluate the concept of using 
stored instrument approach data to automatically fly an instrument approach 
through automatic control of airplane radios and autopilot. The pilots were 
able to maintain situational awareness with this high level of automation by 
using the ATAS alphanumeric display of flight status. Fewer blunders were 
made with the ATAS than with a baseline heading select autopilot mode. Many 
of the blunders committed with ATAS involved pilot confusion over the various 
ATAS modes. Pilot comments and blunders indicate that it will be necessary to 
consolidate the ATAS and autopilot into one device instead of using ATAS as an 
add-on to existing autopilots. 
SUMMARY 
- PILOTS HAD CONFIDENCE IN ATAS ONCE IT WAS ENGAGED BUT HAD SOME DIFFICULTY 
WITH MODE SELECTION 
- PILOTS MAINTAINED BETTER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WITH SIMPLE ALPHANUMERIC 
DISPLAY THAN WITH CONVENTIONAL INSTRUMENTS/AUTOPILOT AND PILOT IN THE LOOP 
- FEWER BLUNDERS WERE MADE WITH ATAS THAN WITH BASELINE HEADING SELECT 
AUTOPILOT 
- PILOT HAS FEWER BLUNDER OPPORTUNITIES WITH ATAS 
ATAS CAN MONITOR PILOT INPUTS 
- 9 OF 11 ATAS BLUNDERS WERE MODE INTERACTION ERRORS 
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